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INSTITUTE OF CONTEMPORARY LAW
THE ROAR, THE WHINE, THE BOOM
AND THE LAW: SOME LEGAL
CONCERNS ABOUT THE SST
Leo A. Huard*
Propeller driven airplanes are noisy, jets are noisier still and
supersonic jets may be the noisiest of all. The first commercial jet
flight in the United States occurred in October of 1958, and now
jets constitute the largest number of aircraft used by commercial
airlines.' About eleven years earlier (October, 1947), the first re-
ported sonic boom had been created by a military aircraft which
exceeded the speed of sound during a test flight.2 Even so, the pos-
sibility of a commercial supersonic transport (SST) was not seri-
ously considered by the aviation industry until 1959.1 The law,
however, had anticipated science and the first legal article dealing
with the sonic boom had already appeared in 1958.1
The operation of commercial jet transports and the prospects
of a commercial supersonic transport have increased public concern
about rising noise levels near airports and about sonic booms at
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1 SENATE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.,
LEGAL AND RELATED ASPECTS OF AIRCRAFT NOISE REGULATION 2-11 (Comm. Print
1967) [hereinafter referred to as 1967 COMM. PRINT].
2 E. EMME, AERONAUTICS AND ASTRONAUTICS 58 (1961).
3 See comments by Boeing Airplane Company Senior Vice Pres. Willwood E.
Beall in Supersonic Airliner Flight Plan Outlined, 70 AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE
TECHNOLOGY, May 25, 1959, at 40. See also Garrison, Supersonic Transport May Aim
at Mach 3, 70 AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, Feb. 2, 1959, at 38.
4 Roth, Sonic Boom: A New Legal Problem, 44 A.B.A.J. 216 (1958).
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places far distant from airports. Former President Lyndon B. John-
son described excessive aircraft noise as an "environmental pollu-
tant" and called upon the heads of departments and agencies to do
something about it.' A newspaper article attributes the term "decibel
pollution" to the Public Health Service and views with alarm the
possible harmful effects to public health from the wide variety of
noisemakers, including jet aircraft, which assail the human ear.6
It is indeed true that we are exposed to a great deal of noise.
A few examples will serve to emphasize the point. Sound is measured
in decibels and the level of normal conversation at three feet is 65
decibels. A food blender in the home may generate 93 decibels; a
subway 95; an outboard motor 102; a power mower 107; and a jet
plane taking-off 150. Researchers have killed mice with 175 decibels
and lengthy exposure to industrial noise at 80 decibels has caused
hearing loss; a daily exposure to 105 decibels will eventually cause
hearing loss to everyone so exposed. Rock and roll establishments
peak at 100 to 115 decibels.7 Motorcycles, power saws and snow-
mobiles also assault the ear with terrible intensity, and the din
shows no sign of abating.
Noise is defined as "unwanted sound"S-a subjective test. The
inclusion in the previous paragraph of such ordinary items as
blenders, outboard motors, power mowers and power saws suggests
that we are all willing to put up with very loud sounds if the sound-
source is otherwise advantageous to us. The loud sound then is
not considered to be a noise; it is welcomed, or tolerated, as the
by-product of a labor-saving device or as a form of entertainment
in itself. Rock and roll music is a delight to teenagers while it is
literally deafening to many adults. One man's music may well be
another man's earache.9
The public balances utility, or desirability, against accompany-
ing noise in accepting, or rejecting, many appliances and machines
5 Memorandum from President Lyndon B. Johnson to Heads of Departments and
Agencies, Mar. 22, 1967.
6 Von Eckardt, Uncle Looks at Our Noise Problem, San Jose Mercury-News, Oct.
13, 1968, at 16, col. 1.
7 Noise-The Fourth Pollution, 3 HEALTH SERVICES WORLD, July-Aug., 1968 at 18.
8 OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE
ALEVIATION OF JET AIRCRAFT NOISE NEAR AIRPORTS 13 (1966) [hereinafter referred to
as O.S.T. REPORT].
9 In Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962), a leading case in this field,
Mr. Griggs recovered a substantial amount because his home was made uninhabitable
by the noise from a nearby airport. He later sold the property to an Episcopal Church
whose congregation has since been bothered only a few times on Sunday mornings.
On those occasions the pastor says that "we simply stop and say a little silent prayer
for the pilot." The Age oj Noise, TnIE, Mar. 16, 1962, at 65.
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found in daily use. Widespread use of a noisy device indicates pub-
lic acceptance. It should be noted that courts have often used a
similar balancing in cases involving competing interests. Courts,
however, generally balance private interests against the public in-
terest and decide on a course of action favorable to the latter. Noise,
including aircraft noise, has been and will continue to be treated in
this manner in litigation. Some noise from jet aircraft is unavoidable
and such noise will usually be held acceptable in the public interest.
It has been suggested that the noise level created by the opera-
tion of an SST will be unacceptable. Among other things, we are
told that a transcontinental SST may create a sonic boom more
than fifty miles wide running the entire length of the United States,
wreaking property damage and general havoc as it flies." After
a brief discussion of the SST program in Congress, this article will
be concerned with the legal ramifications of the operation of the
SST at airports and while in flight.
THE SST PROGRAM AND CONGRESS
Formal interest in the development of a commercial SST pro-
gram for the United States did not begin until early 1960 when the
Bureau of Flight Standards of the Federal Aviation Agency (FAA)
established a Supersonic Transport Group to study the airworthiness,
operations and maintenance standards of the SST. The group sub-
mitted its report to the FAA on March 20, 1961.11 Although not
presenting a specific program for adoption, the report strongly rec-
ommended continued study by government and industry to identify,
minimize or resolve problems dealing with sonic booms, supersonic
aircraft design and operational standards. The report also explored
possible bases for a government-industry relationship in the develop-
ment of an SST.
In November of 1961, the FAA created the Supersonic Trans-
port Advisory Group (composed of private citizens) which was to
recommend a specific program for the SST. Their report of Decem-
ber, 1962, advised the FAA to urge that the federal government
participate with industry in research leading to the development
of a commercial SST.12 A supplementary report from the Group sug-
10 See Baxter, The SST: From Watts to Harlem in Two Hours, 21 STAN. L. REV.
1, 37 (1968); Kryter, Sonic Booms from Supersonic Transport, 163 Sci. 359, 365
(1969).
11 FAA, Bureau of Flight Standards, Supersonic Transports, A Preliminary Study
of Standards For Airworthiness, Operations and Maintenance (Mar., 1961).12 FAA, Supersonic Transport Advisory Group, Report (Dec., 1962).
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gested certain bases upon which a workable relationship between
government and industry could be achieved in the development,
operation and use of the SST?'
Concurrently, Congress, motivated by considerations of the
prestige which inheres in aeronautical superiority and the effect
upon the balance of payments if we failed to develop an SST to
compete on the world market, was exploring the need for an SST.' 4
Although the United States already had military aircraft with super-
sonic capabilities, it was apparent that the aircraft were not designed
to be converted to civil commercial transport, nor susceptible to
such conversion."
On June 5, 1963, President John F. Kennedy, in an address at
the United States Air Force Academy, declared that the govern-
ment would proceed to develop an SST with private industry."
Later that month the President sought a commitment of sixty mil-
lion dollars to finance the initial phase of the SST development
7
-
designing the aircraft. Shortly thereafter, Congress granted the
request for funds.'
8
In August of 1963, the FAA undertook the program for the
development of the SST, with the announced objectives of develop-
ing a transport with:
a) operational characteristics which will insure maximum safety and
adaptability to airport communities and air routes of the world.
b) economic characteristics equal to, or better than, current subsonic
jet transports now engaged in transcontinental and international
operations.19
The first step in this program was to invite industry to partic-
ipate with government in the actual development and manufacture
of an SST. Accordingly, the FAA issued its Request for Proposals
for the Development of a Commercial Supersonic Transport, dated
13 FAA, Supersonic Transport Advisory Group, Supplementary Report (May,
1963).
14 See HOUSE COMM. ON SCIENCE AND AsTRoNAUTIcs, SUPERSONIC AIR TRANSPORTS,
H.R. REP. No. 2041, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (Jun. 30, 1960); see also Hearings on
"Supersonic Air Transports" Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Science and
Astronautics, 86th 'Cong., 2d Sess. (May 17-24, 1960).
15 See Hearings on "Supersonic Air Transports" Before a Subcomm. of the House
Comm. on Science and Astronautics, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 95 (May 17-24, 1960).
16 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, JOHN F. KENNEDY, 1963, at 439, 440-41
(1964).
17 Id. at 475-77.
Is Congress Provides $60 Million For Supersonic Transport, 1963 CONG. Q. AL-
MANAC 502.
19 FAA, Request for Proposals for the Development of a Commercial Supersonic
Transport 2, 3 (Aug. 15, 1963).
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August 15, 1963. The concern of the government at that time, as it
has been throughout the program, appeared to be two-fold; namely,
the necessity for the United States to develop an SST, and the need
for governmental assistance to the aviation industry for research and
development to that end.
While industry was seeking to develop the design for the trans-
port, two federal agencies (National Aeronautics and Space Admin-
istration (NASA) and the FAA) were assigned prime responsibility
for the implementation of the total program. As described in hear-
ings before the House Appropriations Committee:
The NASA role in the national supersonic transport program is to
provide the underlying technology which will be required to construct
a supersonic transport which is economically attractive to our airlines.
The role of FAA is that of developing the supersonic transport based
on this technology.20
It should be noted that notwithstanding these repeated commit-
ments to an SST, the actual program contained safeguards, dealing
with costs, which might stop further development. If the ultimate
construction costs were to make the sale price prohibitive, then the
program for development of the SST would be terminated. 21 Cer-
tainly, if no private manufacturer were willing to undertake actual
production, the program would likewise be halted.
The subsequent history of the competition by private manu-
facturers for SST contracts, and the method of selection of the con-
tractors for the airframe (awarded to Boeing Company 2 ) and the
engine (awarded to General Electric Company23 ) is of little moment.
What is significant, however, is the commitment by the United
States government to develop the SST, and to participate in a unique
contract with industry in which the government not only is to sub-
sidize the development of the commercial SST, but is also to share
royalties on sales of aircraft and aircraft parts under certain con-
ditions.24
The SST developmental program has drawn criticism 25 and has
20 Hearings Before the Independent Offices Subcomm. of the House Appropria-
tions Comm., 89th Cong., 2d Sess., at 1093 (1966).
21 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, JOHN F. KENNEDY, 1963, at 475, 476-77
(1964); Statement of N. E. Halaby, then Administrator of the FAA, in Symposium
on the United States Commercial Supersonic Aircraft Development Program, 30 J. Am
L. & CoM. 1, 10 (1964).
22 Johnson Expected to Push SST, 86 AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECmOLOOY,
Jan. 9, 1967, at 25.
23 Id.
24 FAA, SST Investment Recovery Agreements, Boeing Contract FA-SS-67-3, at
4 (1967) ; General Electric Contract FA-SS-67-7, at 4 (1967).25 E.g., 179 CONG. REc. 14550 (daily ed. Nov. 3, 1966) (remarks of Representa-
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even resulted in the formation of a private citizen's protest group
known as the Civic League Against the Sonic Boom.26 Criticism has
ranged from concern over the irreparable damage that might be
caused by sonic booms (a concern arising from the concept that
the injured party will have no way of knowing or proving that a
particular aircraft is responsible for the damage27) to the question
of the right to be free from unreasonable, high decibel level noises.
2S
Inevitably, opponents of the SST have also challenged the justifica-
tion for government spending in this program when other needs
seemed to be more demanding.2"
Objectors to the SST and others did launch a successful attack
on the noise levels which accompany current jet traffic, and those
foreseen for the proposed SST. The culmination of their efforts
occurred in the Summer of 1968 when Congress amended the Fed-
eral Aviation Act of 1958 in order "[to] afford present and future
relief and protection to the public from unnecessary aircraft noise
and sonic boom."80 This statute requires the Administrator of the
FAA, after consultation with the Secretary of Transportation, to
prescribe and amend standards for the measurement of aircraft
noise and sonic boom, and to promulgate appropriate rules and reg-
ulations for the control and abatement thereof."
There was little doubt that the bill would be favorably acted
upon by Congress since the testimony appeared uncontradicted that
it was in the national interest to abate noise arising from aircraft
operations. Members of Congress, representatives of federal agencies,
city and county associations, airport operators, aircraft associations,
transport associations, as well as critics of the SST program all
joined in urging the passage of this bill.2 In fact, the measure
passed in the House 312-0,3 and by voice vote in the Senate.
84
Perhaps more significant, however, is the number of amendments
tive Kupterman); 112 CONG. REC. 19492-3 (daily ed. Aug. 16, 1966) (remarks of
Senator McGovern) ; 109 CoNG. REC. 20058-60 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1963) (remarks of
Senator Proxmire).
26 The group, headed by Dr. William Shurcliff, has its headquarters in Cambridge,
Massachusetts.
27 Ortner, Sonic Boom: Containment or Confrontation, 34 J. AIR L. & Com.
208, 219-20 (1968).
28 Noise-The Fourth Pollution, 3 HEALTH SERVICES WORLD, July-Aug., 1968,
at 16.
29 See comments by Secretary of the Treasury David M. Kennedy in San Fran-
cisco Chronicle, Mar. 24, 1969, at 11, col. 4.
80 49 U.S.C.A. § 1431(a) (Supp. 1968).
81 Id.
32 Hearing on S. 707 & H.R. 3400 Before the Aviation Subcomm. of the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 90-72, at 1 (1968).
83 114 CONG. REC. H4718-19 (daily ed. June 10, 1968).
34 114 CoNG. REC. S8536 (daily ed. July 11, 1968).
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and varying legislative proposals relating to noise abatement and
SST development which were offered but yielded to the final bill.
One amendment, by Representative Lester L. Wolff (D-N.Y.),
would have prohibited commercial aircraft flights over land areas
in the United States until the sonic boom problem had been solved;"
but the amendment was rejected.36 Another amendment, co-sponsored
by Senators Clifford P. Case (R-N.J.). and William Proxmire (D-
Wis.), provided for a two-year scientific investigation of the sonic
boom and its effects to be conducted by the FAA in consultation
with seven federal departments and agencies. It would also have
banned all non-military flights at supersonic speeds over the United
States, its territories and possessions (except those performed in
connection with the government study), until Congress, after review-
ing the results of the investigation, determined whether the prohibi-
tion against supersonic overflights should be continued.3 7 This amend-
ment was defeated in the Senate.
Other bills introduced in the Ninetieth Congress dealing with
noise abatement and the SST included bills which authorized the
federal government to reimburse: (1) air carriers for expenses they
incurred in modifying or purchasing aircraft designed to comply
with government noise regulation, (2) airport owners or operators
for costs of modifying airports to comply with government noise
regulations and (3) states or municipalities for costs of acquiring
land surrounding airports in order to reduce the effects of noise.38
These bills, along with others,39 also contained provisions authoriz-
ing the establishment of noise abatement rules and regulations.
There were also bills which proposed provisions for the conduct of
noise research by the Department of Transportation. ° It appears,
however, that such authority already exists in sections 307 and 312
of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 4' and the research is in fact
being conducted. Still another bill proposed an amendment to the
Federal Airport Act42 to permit grant-in-aid funds to be applied to
projects for the control of jet aircraft-created noise in classrooms
of schools in close proximity to public airports.43
35 114 CONG. REC. H4716 (daily ed. June 10, 1968).
36 114 CoNG. REc. H4718 (daily ed. June 10, 1968).
37 S. 3399, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
38 See H.R. 91, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968); H.R. 1398, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1967) ; H.R. 2819, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
39 H.R. 92, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); H.R. 618, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967);
H.R. 10523, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
40 H.R. 618, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); H.R. 2819, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967);
H.R. 10523, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
41 49 U.S.C. §§ 1348, 1353 (1964).
42 49 U.S.C. § 1101(3) (1964).
43 H.R. 11073, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
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Two bills which mounted a more serious attack upon the SST
were proposed by Representative Roman C. Pucinski (D-Ill.)."
The first would have amended the Federal Aviation Act of 1958,
to prescribe specifically the liability of the United States for "Tak-
ing of Easements in Navigable Airspace." The bill stated:
The United States shall be liable in any case in which it is established
(1) that an easement in airspace has been taken as the result of the
operation of aircraft in accordance with air traffic rules prescribed by
the Administrator governing the navigation of aircraft through the
navigable airspace of the United States and (2) the person entitled
thereto has not received just compensation for the taking of such
easement.
45
The courts have never held that the United States Government
can be sued for a "taking" caused by a flight merely because the
flight has occurred in accordance with rules and regulations pre-
scribed by the federal agencies .4  Apparently Congress has not
chosen to include such a standard in our aeronautics program.
The second proposal attempted to amend section 610 of the
Federal Aviation Act of 1958 to establish minimum standards for
the operation of civil supersonic aircraft through the navigable air-
space of the United States by adding the following:
c) It shall be unlawful to operate any civil supersonic aircraft in air
transportation through navigable airspace of the United States
which would generate sonic boom overpressures exceeding one and
five-tenths pounds per square foot on the ground directly beneath
the flight path.
d) It shall be unlawful to operate any civil supersonic aircraft into
or out of the United States airports unless it can be demonstrated
that ground noise level generated by such civil supersonic aircraft
is substantially lower than that generated by long-range subsonic
jet aircraft .... 47
One other approach to the SST program was a proposal to
establish a private, non-governmental corporation, subsequent to
the development of the SST, to be responsible for the commercial
production and sale of the airplane.48 The failure of the bill to pass
leaves the commercial production and sale as an eventual responsi-
bility of the aviation industry, with the government merely sharing
on a specified royalty basis.
44 H.R. 1102, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); H.R. 1110, 90th 'Cong., 1st Sess.
(1967).
45 H.R. 1102, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
46 See p. 200 infra.
47 H.R. 1110, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
48 H.R. 12, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
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Already in the Ninety-First Congress, on February 7, 1969,
Senator Jacob Javits (R-N.Y.) on behalf of Senator Clifford Case
(R-N.J.) introduced a bill4" which appears to parallel the defeated
proposed amendment of 1968 imposing a two-year ban on non-
military flights over the United States (its territories and posses-
sions), if the flight is to be operated in such a way as to produce
sonic booms. The ban would except flights involved in a study, by
the FAA and other agencies,5" to determine the levels of exposure
to sonic boom which are detrimental to the health and welfare of any
persons.
The most significant factor affecting the timetable and the
current status of the SST program was the pronouncement by Pres-
ident Richard M. Nixon during his first month in office, directing
the Department of Transportation to establish a committee to in-
vestigate all aspects of the SST program.5
It seems certain that eventually there will be a commercial
SST. It may be delayed, or postponed, but the national commit-
ment in terms of public and private effort makes abandonment un-
likely. Therefore, a review of applicable law, actual and potential,
is in order.
AIRPORT AND AIRCRAFT NOISE
Private Remedies
Of the many legal questions presented by aircraft and airports,
ambient noise has been most discussed and most litigated. Legal
literature abounds in cases and articles forming an impressive array
of precedents for any litigation which may now arise.52
The noise problems of the supersonic transport fall naturally
into two distinct categories. One is the noise ordinarily associated
with jet aircraft (the roar of the exhaust and the whine of the com-
pressor), the other is the sonic boom or shock wave. They are quite
different.
49 S. 942, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
50 Departments of Health, Education, and Welfare, Defense, Housing and Urban
Development, Interior, and Commerce, NASA, and the National Academy of Sciences.
51 5 WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 193 (Feb. 3, 1969).
52 See generally Tondel, Noise Litigation at Public Airports, 32 J. Am L. & Com.
387 (1966); Dygert, An Economic Approach to Airport Noise, 30 J. Am L. & Com. 207
(1964); Harvey, Landowners' Rights in the Air Age: The Airport Dilemma, 56
Micwa. L. REV. 1313 (1958); and Nagel, The Causby Case and the Relation of Land-
owners and Aviators-A New Theory for the Protection of the Landowner, 14 J. Am
L. & Com. 112 (1947). For a general discussion of the law of noise, see Spater,
Noise and the Law, 63 MICH. L. REv. 1373 (1965).
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The courts have heretofore allowed suits for airport and air-
craft noise on three different theories: trespass, nuisance and a
"taking" of the plaintiff's property. The actions have appeared as
petitions to enjoin the sound-source and as suits for damage caused
by the sound.
Classically, trespass is a physical invasion of another's posses-
sory interest in property.5s Airport noise involving the take-off and
landing of aircraft may reach a neighbor merely because of hor-
izontal proximity. It is difficult to visualize such lateral propagation
of sound waves as a physical invasion of a possessory interest in
real property. In-flight engine noise may reach people on the ground
when aircraft engage in overflight or in nearby lateral flight. The
trespass cases have ordinarily involved noise from overflight and
the plaintiffs have usually relied on the maxim "cujus est solum ejus
est usque ad coelum," 54 the owner of the land owns the airspace to
the sky above.
The validity of the theory of trespass has been seriously im-
pugned by United States v. Causby" and section 104 of the Fed-
eral Aviation Act of 1958. 1 In Causby, the Supreme Court said:
It is ancient doctrine that at common law ownership of the land
extended to the periphery of the universe-Cujus est solum ejus est
usque ad coelum. But that doctrine has no place in the modern world.
The air is a public highway, as Congress has declared. Were that not
true, every transcontinental flight would subject the operator to count-
less trespass suits. Common sense revolts at the idea. 57
This is a formal holding endorsing the same view earlier ex-
pressed by Mr. Justice Jackson in a concurring opinion.
Today the landowner no more possesses a vertical control of all
the air above him than a shore owner possesses horizontal control of all
the sea before him. The air is too precious as an open highway to permit
it to be "owned" to the exclusion or embarrassment of air navigation
by surface landlords who could put it to little real use.58
Since 1958, congressional policy in this matter has existed in
statutory form. The Federal Aviation Act recognizes that every citi-
zen of the United States has "a public right of freedom of transit
53 McPheters v. Loomis, 125 Conn. 526, -, 7 A.2d 437, 440 (1939).
6 See generally Abramovitch, The Maxim "Cujus Est Solum Ejus Usque Ad
Coelum" as Applied in Aviation, 8 McGmL L.J. 246 (1962) ; Anderson, Some Aspects
of Airspace Trespass, 27 J. Am L. & Com. 341 (1960).
55 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
'56 49 U.S.C. § 1304 (1964).
57 328 U.S. at 260-61 (footnote omitted).




through the navigable airspace of the United States." 59 Navigable air-
space is defined as "airspace above the minimum altitudes of flight
prescribed by regulations issued under this chapter, and shall include
airspace needed to insure safety in take-off and landing of aircraft."6
It seems reasonably clear that trespass to airspace can be main-
tained only if there is flight, in the airspace immediately above the
land, interfering unreasonably with the landowner's use and enjoy-
ment of his property.6" Supersonic aircraft will not offend in these
respects any more, or any less, than other jet aircraft. In take-off
and landing operations, the supersonic aircraft will operate at sub-
sonic speeds and will be operationally indistinguishable from other
jets. Since it will fly at a much higher altitude, its "ordinary" in-
flight engine noises will be even less discernible than that of other
jets. The SST will not trespass physically nor through its engine
noise anymore than jets in current operation.
Another avenue of potential recovery in aircraft noise suits is
the theory of nuisance.6 2 The basis for the action is that the de-
fendant has interfered with the plaintiff's use and enjoyment of
his property and that the plaintiff ought, therefore, to be compen-
sated. It should be noted here that most of the noise suits are predi-
cated on more than one theory, e.g., trespass and nuisance; and that
plaintiffs usually seek injunctive relief or, alternatively, money dam-
ages. However, no case has been found where a court has enjoined
the operation of a publicly owned and publicly operated airport.63
Here, as in other nuisance cases, the court weighs the plaintiff's
interest in the quiet enjoyment of his property against the interests
of the defendant and the general public in the airport and in air
transportation. Another factor entering the case at this point is that
public airports are very often operated under statutory authority.
Normally, it is also true that commercial airliners using the facility
are licensed to operate by appropriate government authority. In
this situation the courts usually find that the nuisance, if there be
one, has been "legalized." This means simply that conduct which
constitutes a nuisance has been excepted from that invidious cate-
gory and has been made lawful by legislative fiat. Activities which
result in a legalized nuisance in the sense just described are no
59 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1304 (1964).
60 Id. § 1301(24).
61 See Schronk v. Gillian, 380 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964); Cheskov v.
Port of Seattle, 55 Wash. 2d 416, 348 P.2d 673 (1960); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 159 (1965).
62 O.S.T. REPORT at 122; see Note, Airplane Noise: Problem in Tort Law and




longer actionable under the nuisance theory. While the application
of this doctrine varies from state to state, it has been followed quite
frequently when the issue has been raised. 4
The nuisance theory has had little success in noise cases in-
volving both propeller and ordinary jet aircraft and public airports
servicing such aircraft. It seems unlikely that the theory will be
more successful when applied to subsonic operations of the SST.
Airport and aircraft noise litigation has most frequently been
based on a theory of unconstitutional "taking." The plaintiff usually
alleges that the airport owner has taken (inversely condemned) the
plaintiff's property by causing noisy flights to be made over it. The
fifth and fourteenth amendments, and similar state constitutional
provisions, then require that the plaintiff be fairly compensated for
his loss.
In United States v. Causby 5 the Supreme Court stated:
"Flights over private land are not a taking, unless they are so low
and so frequent as to be a direct and immediate interference with
the enjoyment and use of the land."" In that case, overflights con-
stituted a taking because altitude and frequency were such that some
150 frightened chickens had killed themselves by flying into the
walls, thus destroying "the use of the property as a commercial
chicken farm."6
In Griggs v. Allegheny County,68 sixteen years later, the Su-
preme Court again found a taking of the plaintiffs' property where
flights over their country home at heights of thirty to three hundred
feet were "regular and almost continuous" 69 and had made the home
"undesirable and unbearable for their residential use." °
It is important to note that in both cases low, frequent over-
flights were proved, or alleged without contradiction. In both cases
the occupants abandoned their property because of the overflights;
and in both cases the Supreme Court made it clear that a taking
resulted because the plaintiffs' properties were rendered unfit for the
64 O.S.T. REPORT at 125; see, e.g., Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233
U.s. 546 (1914).
65 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
66 Id. at 266.
67 Id. at 259.
68 369 U.S. 84 (1962).
69 Id. at 87.
70 Id.; but see Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 955 (1963) ; Leavell v. United States, 234 F. Supp. 734 (E.D.S.C.
1964). For a thorough discussion of the Griggs case see Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny
County in Perspective: Thirty Years of Supreme Court Expropriation Law, 1962
THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW 63.
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uses to which they were being put. The cases illustrate the decreas-
ing emphasis placed on physical taking by the courts. This prob-
ably results from a recognition that property interests are in fact
a conglomerate of intangibles, e.g. rights, privileges and powers
with respect to an object."
Decisions on the "taking" theory may also arise in state courts
since every state constitution requires compensation for the taking
of a person's property. The state constitutional provisions show
minor deviations in language, but where the issue has arisen, the
state courts have held that a "taking" in the constitutional sense
occurs only when the plaintiff has been substantially deprived of
the use of his property. The language of Thornburg v. Port of Port-
land72 is apt and typical.
The idea that must be expressed to the jury is that before the
plaintiff may recover for a taking of his property he must show by the
necessary proof that the activities of the government are unreasonably
interfering with his use of his property, and in so substantial a way as
to deprive him of the practical enjoyment of his land. 73
As previously indicated, the taking cases have usually dealt
with low and frequent overflights and the emphasis in the judicial
opinions has been on the fact that such overflying has made the
plaintiff's property uninhabitable and unusable. In this context,
the Thornburg opinion deserves closer scrutiny since the court there
held that a noise-nuisance can amount to a taking without over-
flights.74
In Thornburg, the Supreme Court of Oregon held, in a very
close decision (4-3), that evidence of frequent nearby lateral flights
had been erroneously excluded by the trial judge. The court said
that a nuisance may constitute a taking whenever "a possessor is in
fact ousted from the enjoyment of his land. M 5
The court explained that if the noise problem were treated
as a nuisance rather than a trespass, the jury could balance the
harm to the plaintiff's interest against the community benefits flow-
ing from the operation of the airport.76 Thus the court's ruling lib-
eralizes the introduction of evidence for both plaintiff and defendant.
71 Dunham, supra note 70, at 82.
72 233 Ore. 178, 376 P.2d 100 (1962), noted in 1963 DUKE L.J. 563, 41 TEXAS
L. REV. 827 (1963) and 2 WiLLAMETTE L.J. 500 (1963).
73 Id. at -, 376 P.2d at 110.
74 Id. at -, 376 P.2d at 106-07. However, a review of earlier cases demonstrates
that, in the last decade, damages have been awarded in only two cases where the
overflights were at a height greater than 200 feet. O.S.T. REPORT at 127.
75 233 Ore. at -, 376 P.2d at 105.
76 Id. at -, 376 P.2d at 107.
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This seems certain to focus the jury's attention on the public inter-
est more sharply than would be usual in a "taking" case. It is sig-
nificant to note that the jury awarded no damages to the plaintiffs
on remand.
7
The dissenters vigorously pointed out that the court's opinion
erased the distinction between trespass and nuisance,78 and that the
abrogation of this distinction was for the legislature rather than the
court.79 They stated that the majority holding that evidence of lat-
eral flights was admissible evidence in an action for taking was
without precedent. The dissent concluded that the plaintiffs could
have sued in nuisance for damages, but having elected to sue on the
theory of a "taking" of their property, plaintiffs were bound by the
eminently correct decision of the trial court.8 0 They did agree with
the majority that the plaintiffs must show a substantial interference
with their property rights in order to obtain relief under any theory. 1
Twenty-one states have so-called "damaging" provisions in their
constitutions designed to compensate private parties for injuries to
property not amounting to a taking." The Washington constitutional
damaging provision 8 has been established as the basis for a decision
of great significance to the aviation industry. In Martin v. Port of
Seattle,84 196 plaintiffs living within sixteen blocks of the Seattle-
Tacoma Airport brought suit against the Port of Seattle as owner-
operator of the airport. The plaintiffs alleged "taking" in the consti-
tutional sense by reason of noise from frequent low overflights and
also "damaging" within the terms of the Washington Constitution.
The only issue originally tried before the judge was liability-
damages being reserved for subsequent jury trials. The trial judge
held the Port liable to all plaintiffs without distinguishing the vary-
ing degrees in which the defendant had interfered with the plaintiffs'
use of their respective properties. In a soaring flight of judicial
interpretation he said that in Causby and Griggs:
[T]he United States Supreme Court has held that it is contrary to the
provisions of the fourteenth amendment for any government operating
77 O.S.T. REPORT at 127.
78 233 Ore. at -, 376 P.2d at 113-16.
79 Id. at -, 376 P.2d at 116.
80 Id. at -, 376 P.2d at 116-17.
81 Id. at -, 376 P.2d at 115.
82 LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING RESEARCH FUND OF COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, INDEX
DIGEST OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS 464 (2d ed. 1959).
83 "No private property shall be taken or damaged for public or private use
without just compensation having been first made, or paid into court for the owner
. " WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 16 (amendment 9) (emphasis added).
84 64 Wash. 2d 309, 391 P.2d 540 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 989 (1965),
noted in 39 WASH. L. REV. 398 (1964).
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an airfield to not condemn and pay for reasonable use of air space
adjacent to airports. s 5
The Supreme Court of Washington heard the appeal en banc.
In an opinion which ignored the lower court's clearly erroneous
interpretation of Causby and Griggs, the supreme court affirmed
the decision below. Placing heavy reliance on the constitutional
damaging clause, it held that the owner-operator was liable for all
damage suffered by any of the plaintiffs from aircraft operations.
Damage was defined as a depreciation in the market value of plain-
tiffs' real estate resulting from the operation of jet aircraft."0
This is a far cry from the substantial interference with the
plaintiffs' property required in the "taking" cases and, in fact, the
Washington Supreme Court expressly rejected substantial inter-
ference as an injury criterion in this case.87 The court seemed to
feel that inverse condemnation and direct condemnation were sub-
ject to evaluation with the same measures."8 Since in direct con-
demnation the state must pay whatever damages are assessed re-
gardless of the extent of the injury or the substantiality of the
defendant's interference, the same yardstick should be applied to
inverse condemnation by constitutional "taking" or "damaging."
Here, therefore, minor damage may be recoverable.
However, the court's reasoning ignores the fact that inverse and
direct condemnation, as the labels imply, present different sides of
the same coin. In direct condemnation, a public body has made a
deliberate, formal decision that the plaintiff's property is necessary
for a public use. In inverse condemnation, the public body has either
made no decision at all with respect to plaintiff's property, or it has
decided that it is not needed for a public use. When inverse con-
demnation occurs, the court forces the public body to reverse its
former decision, or to come to an entirely new decision and to
expend tax money for the plaintiff's property.89 Law and logic do
not demand that both kinds of condemnation be treated alike. It
would not seem to be unfair to require that the party seeking in-
verse condemnation prove substantial interference by the condemnor
with his use and enjoyment of his property.
Although it seems that Washington "taking" cases will still
85 Martin v. Port of Seattle, Civ. No. 560219 (King County Super. Ct., Wash.,
Oct. 5, 1962).
86 Martin v. Port of Seattle, 64 Wash. 2d 309, -, 391 P.2d 540, 547 (1964);
see O.S.T. REPORT at 129.
87 64 Wash. 2d at-, 391 P.2d at 546; see O.S.T. REPORT at 129.
88 64 Wash. 2d at -, 391 P.2d at 547; see O.S.T. REPORT at 129.
89 See Van Alstyne, Modernizing Inverse Condemnation: A Legislative Prospectus,
8 SANTA CLARA LAW. 1 (1967).
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follow the general rule that substantial interference with property
is required,90 Martin continues to stand for an easier rule in consti-
tutional damaging cases. The decision is an economically important
one to airport operators.
Municipal Ordinances
Thus far this discussion has been limited to the forms of relief
theoretically available to private parties who claim injury from air-
port and aircraft noise. However, municipalities have also sought
to abate such noise by enacting appropriate legislation 9' in the
interest of the peace and quiet of their citizens. These ordinances have
in turn provoked airport operators and airlines into affirmative
countermeasures. The ordinances and the cases merit close scrutiny.
At least four municipalities in the United States have enacted
ordinances designed to suppress airport and aircraft noise. Some
approach the problem by regulating the altitude at which aircraft
may fly over the city or town. 2 Some prescribe permissible noise
levels at varying distances from the runways, such levels usually be-
ing expressed in decibels (db) or perceived noise decibels (PNdb).
The ordinances vary greatly in complexity and only one, the simplest
of the lot, is specifically directed at supersonic transport and the
sonic boom.94 Fines are the normal penalty, although imprisonment
is a possibility under one ordinance." One airport operator has
joined the fray by setting maximum noise levels as operating condi-
tions at its airport.96 Another has passed an anti-noise resolution
which has a strongly hortatory tone. 7
90 See Anderson v. Port of Seattle, 66 Wash. 2d 457, 403 P.2d 368 (1965).
91 In the past, airport zoning ordinances have sought to impose height and use
restrictions on adjoining landowners for the benefit of airport operators. See Seago,
The Airport Noise Problem and Airport Zoning, 28 MD. L. REv. 120 (1968); Note,
The Validity of Airport Zoning Ordinances, 1965 DUKE L.J. 792; Comment, Airport
Approach Zoning: Ad Coelum Rejuvenated, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1451 (1965). The
ordinances discussed in these pages, however, seek to enforce noise suppression at
the airport site for the benefit of the neighbors.
92 E.g., Audubon Park, Ky., Ordinance 4, § 1 (Series 1967), Nov. 20, 1967.
"It shall be unlawful for any person ...or business entity to fly, operate, or in any
manner participate or engage in the flight or operation of any aircraft over the ...
City at a height of less than seven hundred and fifty (750) feet."
93 E.g., Park Ridge, Ill., Ordinance 64-2, § 2(c), Jan. 7, 1964. "A noise heard,
measured, registered and recorded . . .more than 87 decibels in intensity shall be
and is hereby declared to be an unusually loud noise and is prohibited, provided how-
ever, that if the said noise is made or created by an aircraft in flight over ... an
airport runway extension, such noise so heard .. . of more than 95 decibels in in-
tensity shall be ...declared to be an unusually loud noise and is prohibited."
94 Santa Barbara, Cal., Ordinance 3246, Sept. 26, 1967.
95 See Hempstead, N.Y., Ordinance 25, amended, Nov. 19, 1963.
96 See Port of New York Authority regulation in 1967 CoMM. PRINT at 104.




Airport and airline operators have sought the aid of the courts
to prevent enforcement of altitude and anti-noise ordinances. The
two types of ordinances are aimed at the same thing: noise. By
setting a "floor" below which aircraft cannot fly over the municipal
limits, the altitude ordinance alleviates the noise distress of the
people below. Similarly, by setting maximum noise levels, the other
ordinances effectively set the altitudes at which airplanes can ap-
proach the airport. Important and illustrative cases are: Allegheny
Airlines v. Village of Cedarhurst; s American Airlines v. City of
Audubon Park;9 9 and American Airlines v. Town of Hempstead."'
In the Cedarhurst case, the airlines sought to enjoin enforce-
ment of the ordinance which prohibited overflight at an altitude of
less than 1000 feet.101 After extended litigation, the petitioner pre-
vailed and the village was denied the right to enforce its ordinance.0 2
In Audubon Park, a federal district court permanently enjoined
the enforcement of a 750 foot minimum altitude ordinance enacted
by a suburb of Louisville, Kentucky. 08
The anti-noise ordinance in the Hempstead case involved New
York City's John F. Kennedy International Airport, perhaps the
largest and busiest airport in the nation and certainly one of the
most important. The plaintiffs were nine major certificated United
States air carriers, the Port of New York Authority (operator of
Kennedy Airport), the Air Lines Pilots Association, International,
its president, and three other pilots as representatives of their class.
The defendants were Hempstead and seven of its officials in their
official capacities. The Administrator of the FAA intervened and
supported the plaintiffs' motions for a preliminary injunction. 4
The great importance of the airport and the large number of
people affected by its noise presented a hard case. As the Court of
Appeals was to say later:
The Town of Hempstead, primarily residential, is the largest town in
New York State, with an estimated population in 1963 of nearly
806,000. It lies to the east of John F. Kennedy International Airport
("JFK"), and it is estimated that 150,000 people live in its incorporated
villages which lie within three miles of the Airport. These people share
with many others ... a severe aircraft noise problem ....
98 132 F. Supp. 871 (E.D.N.Y. 1955), aff'd, 238 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1956), noted
in 54 MIcH. L. REV. 998 (1956) and 35 ORE. L. REV. 296 (1956).
99 No. 5828 (W.D. Ky., Mar. 6, 1968).
100 272 F. Supp. 226 (E.D.N.Y. 1967), aff'd, 398 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1968).
101 Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. Cedarhurst, 132 F. Supp. 871 (E.D.N.Y. 1955).
102 Id. at 885.
103 No. 5828 (W.D. Ky., Mar. 6, 1968).




. . . The District Court found that: "There is credible evidence
that the noise of an aircraft overflight in Hempstead is frequently
intense enough to interrupt sleep, conversation and the conduct of
religious services, and to submerge for the duration of the maximum
noise part of the overflight the sound of radio, phonograph and tele-
vision ......
"There is credible evidence that the noise of an aircraft overflight
in Hempstead is frequently intense enough to interrupt classroom
activities in schools and to be a source of discomfort to the ill and
distraction to the well ......
"It is a fair inference ... that airplane noise is a factor of moment
affecting the decisions of people to acquire or dispose of interests in
real property in the areas within the Town affected by the sound of
airplane overflights....
Nevertheless, the federal district court granted the petitioners'
request for an injunction. The district judge concluded that the
ordinance unconstitutionally burdened interstate commerce; 1 6 that
it operated in an area pre-empted by federal legislation and regula-
tions; 1o and, that it was in direct conflict with applicable federal
regulations .1o8
The court of appeals affirmed on the ground that the Hempstead
ordinance was in direct conflict with applicable federal regulations
controlling the patterns and procedures of aircraft flying in and out
of Kennedy Airport. 09 The ordinance and the regulations were in
direct conflict because "compliance with the noise ordinance would
require alterations in the flight patterns and procedures established
by federal regulations."" 0 The court did not consider the question
of the burdening of interstate commerce and of federal pre-emp-
tion,"' although it seems likely that it would have decided affirma-
tively on both issues. It did hold that the Cedarhurst case was
"square precedent for holding the Hempstead ordinance invalid, 1 12
and it distinguished"11 a California case which had reached a similar
conclusion on the "conflict" rationale, but had declined to accept
"pre-emption."" 4
The three grounds advanced by the district court are those
105 398 F.2d 369, 370 (2d Cir. 1968).
106 272 F. Supp. at 234 (E.D.N.Y. 1967).
107 Id. at 233.
108 Id. at 232.
109 398 F.2d at 373-74 (2d Cir. 1968).
110 Id. at 375.
111 Id. at 376 n.4.
112 Id. at 375.
118 Id. at 372.
114 Loma Portal Civic Club v. American Airlines, Inc., 61 Cal. 2d 582, 394 P.2d
548, 39 Cal. Rptr. 708 (1964).
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frequently urged by commentators on this aspect of "noise" litiga-
tion. These grounds have been successful notwithstanding the fact
that the ordinances were phrased'in terms of specific prohibitions
against noise or limitations on altitude. Both are invalid when they
conflict directly with federal regulations on flight, and such conflict
appears inevitable whenever an airport is adjacent to the limits of
a town or city.
Municipal ordinances having failed to control the airport noise
problem, airport operators attempted some novel solutions. The
Port of New York Authority operates the John F. Kennedy Inter-
national Airport and considers itself to be the landlord of the air-
lines using that facility. In its capacity as landlord-lessor it has
set certain "lease conditions" which the lessee-airlines must meet.
One such condition is that the noise-level of aircraft takeoffs must
not exceed 112 PNdb at certain specified distances from the borders
of the airport. With considerable grumbling the airlines have met
the Port Authority's conditions." 5
This effort at enforced noise suppression has placed the Port
Authority in a peculiar legal posture. In the Hempstead case, the
Port Authority joined the airlines as plaintiffs and urged with them
that Hempstead's ordinance was in direct conflict with federal
regulations and attempted to operate in an area pre-empted by the
Federal Government. As operator of Kennedy Airport, however, it
enforces its own regulation which does affect flight patterns and
procedures at the airport. The Port Authority maintains that its
regulation is an expression of the common-law right of property
ownership and control and thus can exist side-by-side with federal
laws and regulations.' The Port Authority's regulation has only
been tested once and it has been upheld, at least at the district court
level." 7 If the Port Authority's position is a valid one, local govern-
ments may not need to resort to "police power" to impose maximum
noise limits. Municipal airport departments may achieve the same
end by setting appropriate conditions in the airport lease-contract.
A resolution of the Los Angeles Board of Airport Commissioners
recites the Board's recognition that the supersonic transport is being
developed and is likely to be used." 8 The Board then indicates its
awareness of "the serious noise and community relations problems"
caused by subsonic jets and does "urge and request" that the deci-
115 See 1967 COMM. PRINT at 60-64.
116 Id. at 65-68.
117 Port of New York Authority v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 259 F. Supp. 745
(E.D.N.Y. 1966).
118 Los Angeles, Cal., Resolution 2059, Sept. 25, 1963.
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sion makers involved in SST development arrange matters so that
supersonic aircraft will be able to: operate from existing and pres-
ently planned airports, produce noise levels in the airport environ-
ment compatible with the comfort, health and welfare of all persons
in that area, and accept noise suppression devices during ground
maintenance operations.
The Board further resolves that it will place restrictions on
supersonic transport operations at the Los Angeles International
Airport unless certain sound levels are achieved in the aircraft de-
sign. These sound levels are then expressed in terms of perceived
noise decibels (112-120 PNdb), at specified distances from the run-
way. Since the noise standard of the Port Authority of New York
is 112 PNdb it can be seen that the Los Angeles Airport Commis-
sioners really do mean to limit supersonic jets to noise levels no
greater than those produced by subsonic jets.
Two other ordinances have not yet been the subject of reported
judicial decisions. Park Ridge, Illinois, a neighbor to Chicago's busy
O'Hare International Airport, has passed a noise abatement ordi-
nance1 9 essentially similar to the Hempstead ordinance. It is likely
that federal courts in Illinois would deny enforcement to the Park
Ridge ordinance for the same reason that the Second Circuit struck
down the Hempstead ordinance, i.e., direct conflict with federal regu-
lations controlling flight. It is possible, of course, that in such a test
the Illinois federal courts might go further and find that the ordi-
nance is an undue burden on interstate commerce or that the federal
government has pre-empted the field. It seems extremely unlikely
that the court would find the ordinance to be a proper exercise of
police power by the Park Ridge City Council.
The City of Santa Barbara, California, has taken still another
tack by enacting an ordinance directed squarely at the supersonic
transport.12 0 The ordinance is unique in that it deals only with SST
overflight. Santa Barbara does not now have a busy international air-
port accommodating hundreds of jet flights daily and it is not likely
in the foreseeable future to be a point of origin and termination for
supersonic flights. Nonetheless, the city council has ordained:
Section 1. That flights of manned and piloted aircraft over and in the
vicinity of the City of Santa Barbara so as to cause loud, sudden and
intense "sonic booms" in the City constitute a public nuisance.
Section 2. That it is hereby declared to be unlawful to pilot any air-
craft over and in the vicinity of the City of Santa Barbara at super-
119 Park Ridge, Ill., Ordinance 64-2, Jan. 7, 1964.
120 Santa Barbara, Cal., Ordinance 3246, Sept. 26, 1967.
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sonic speeds so as to cause loud, sudden and intense "sonic boom"
impacts in the City of Santa Barbara.121
The councilman who introduced the ordinance concedes that
"it is an extension of the police power into areas where it has not
been used before, and we are aware that we are pioneering and
making new law in a new field."'122
Meanwhile, the federal government has acted to tighten its
control over airport and aircraft noise by amending the Federal
Aviation Act of 1958.12" The amendment provides that the FAA
prescribe standards, rules and regulations for the measurement and
abatement of aircraft noise and sonic boom and that the Administra-
tor apply such standards, rules and regulations in issuing, amending,
suspending, or revoking any certificates authorized by the act.'12 4
These include certificates of public convenience and necessity, 125
airman certificates,'2 6 aircraft certificates 1 27 and air carrier operating
certificates.128
The amendment would seem to strengthen the Cedarhurst and
Hempstead decisions and to extend federal control to sonic booms
as well as ordinary airport and aircraft noises. It further reinforces
the web of federal regulation in this area and makes it less likely that




The peculiar roar and whine of subsonic jet aircraft are prod-
ucts of the engines and compressors. They are significant only at
airports and where jets are flying nearby at low altitudes. Those
who are at substantial distances, a mile or two, from an airport
usually do not hear this noise. Those who observe high flying jets
hear the engine sounds only as a distant drone, if at all.
Supersonic jets will cruise out of sight and out of hearing so
far as engine sounds are concerned. While in flight, however, they
121 Id.
122 Address by Councilman Kemp, Santa Barbara, Cal., City Council, Nov. 19,
1967.
123 See p. 194 supra.
124 49 U.S.C.A. § 1431(a) (Supp. 1968).
125 49 U.S.C. § 1371 (1964).
126 Id. § 1422.
127 Id. § 1423.
128 Id. § 1424.
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may, and often will, produce an abrupt clap of sound known as the
"sonic boom." The term sonic boom is a description, not a definition.
This sound comes not from the engines, but from the compression
of the air as the body of the airplane passes through it at extremely
high speeds.' 29 The surface of the aircraft pushes into the air mass,
compresses it and forces it ahead as a fast moving wave front which
continues as long as the aircraft is traveling at supersonic speeds.'
Thus, the sonic boom is not a phenomenon which occurs only when
an airplane goes through the sound barrier.
The speeding shock wave will subject anything it strikes to an
instantaneous increase in surface pressure. The normal atmospheric
pressure on the earth's surface at sea level is approximately 15
pounds per square inch (2,000 plus pounds per square foot). The
increase above this pressure caused by the shock wave is referred
to as the "overpressure" and when measured in pounds per square
foot (psf), it becomes a convenient index of the magnitude of the
shock wave. When the shock wave strikes the ground or something
upon it, the sensation of a bang is created. It has been described
"as the footprint on the ground of a supersonic airplane in steady
flight.'' 1 1
The force with which the SST's footprint strikes the ground
depends upon the size, shape, mass, and speed of the aircraft, as
well as the altitude of its flight. The bigger, heavier, faster and
lower the airplane, the stronger its shock wave will be. Ideally, the
SST should be pencil-slim, as light as possible and capable of
traveling at very high altitudes where the great distance to the
ground permits the shock wave to dissipate before it strikes.
The proposed Boeing SST is a very large airplane. It will
measure about 300 feet in length and weigh in excess of '300 tons.
It will cruise at an altitude of 60,000-70,000 feet at a speed of Mach
2.7 (2.7 times the speed of sound or 1800 miles per hour)."' The
British-French Concorde is much smaller and the Russian transport,
smaller still. 133 Both of the latter have begun flight tests at subsonic
speeds and thus far have apparently met expectations.
'129 See Hubbard, Nature of the Sonic-Boom Problem, 39 J. ACOUSTICAL SOC'Y
A .S1, $2-53 (1966).
130 See Lyster, The Nature of the Sonic Boom, 4 MATERIALS RESEARCH & STAND-
ARDS 582 (1964).
181 Busemann, The Feasibility of Large Sonic Boom Reductions, in SECOND CON-
FERENCE oN SONIC BOOm RESEARCH 125 (NASA SP-180, 1968).
132 Gunston, The Three Supersonic Transports, 4 ScI. J., Sept., 1968, 32 at 35-36.
133 Gross Weight (lbs.) Passengers Max. Length (ft.)
Russian TU-144 330,000 100-130 180
British-French Concorde 385,800 132 193
Boeing SST proto 750,000 299 280
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Experts all agree that the Boeing SST will create a very sub-
stantial shock wave, but that is about as far as agreement goes. The
magnitude of the wave and the amount of damage it will cause is
open to speculation, and speculation there has beenl It is fair to
say that much of this "guesswork" has been grim and that the
prognosis for the SST has often been painted in gloomy shades.'84
Extensive sonic boom tests have been conducted in various parts
of the country seeking to determine when "overpressures" become
damaging and when the boom becomes too annoying for society to
accept. The longest and most completely supervised test was held
over Oklahoma City in 1964.
This test involved eight flights per day, every day for six months,
between 7:00 a.m. and 1:20 p.m. along a designated path, south-
west to northeast above Oklahoma City. Twelve hundred and fifty-
three flights were made. Forty miles of each 100-mile flight was at
supersonic speeds, and the flights were designed to create over-
pressures ranging from 1.5 psf to 2.0 psf and back to 1.3 psf in
the final weeks of the test. For the first half of the test, F-104
fighters were used and for the second half F-101 fighters, both much
lighter and smaller than the proposed Boeing SST.135
A total of 12,588 complaints (including 2234 repeat calls) were
received at the FAA complaint center. Taking into consideration
the total population of the study area and the 178 days of boom
runs, there were a total of 752,000,000 boom exposures (1253 flights
times 600,000 population). This is an average of one complaint for
every 63,000 boom exposures. 138
6
Of the 12,588 complaints, 8335 alleged damage to property and
a total of 2170 formal damage claims were filed with the government.
Most of these (1732) were denied and those approved by the end
of the test averaged $52.81 per claim.137 A majority of the claims
involved damage to plaster and glass. It should be noted that the
FAA asserted that no damage had occurred in any of the test houses
it maintained under and adjacent to the flight path."8 About one-
Specifications, 90 AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, Mar. 10, 1969, at 145,
180, 149.
134 See Baxter, The SST: From Watts to Harlem in Two Hours, 21 STAN. L.
REV. 1 (1968) ; Kryter, Sonic Booms jrom Supersonic Transport, 163 SCI. 359 (1969).




138 Id. at 72.
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fourth of the exposed population found the boom unacceptable,'1 9
even though "candid camera" films taken in downtown Oklahoma
City at the height of the boom show no visible reaction of the
citizens. 4 °
Tests conducted in other areas' 4 ' tend to support the results
of the Oklahoma City tests, i.e., the pattern of complaints is the
same in other localities. Upwards of twenty-five percent of the popu-
lation describe the boom as intolerable, and the damage complaints
usually concern minor property damage.' 42 The typical complaining
citizen is annoyed by the noise, and he may be upset also by cracks
in his plaster walls or by a broken window.
The original design target for the United States SST was an air-
craft which would produce a maximum overpressure of 2.0 psf in
climbing and 1.5 psf while cruising. 4 Although there is some conflict
of authority, it seems to be generally conceded that overpressures in
the 1.5-2.0 psf range will not cause structural damage to sound
buildings.'" In fact such overpressures would probably not crack
plaster or break windows, if the plaster and windows had not pre-
viously been exposed to significant stress.'4 5 In other words, if over-
pressures could be limited to 1.5-2.0 psf there would be very little
property damage, and that only to property which had been weak-
ened by prior conditions and circumstances.
However, even if the engineers were successful in designing and
manufacturing such an aircraft there would be still another factor
with which to contend. An aircraft properly designed and con-
structed to produce no more than 1.5-2.0 psf overpressure will in-
evitably exceed these limitations from time to time. This is because
factors, other than design, operate to magnify the sonic boom, e.g.,
atmospheric conditions and maneuvering. 46 About one-tenth of one
139 Beranek, Noise, SCIENTIFIC AM., Dec., 1966, at 66, 76.
140 The Sonic Boom Comes Home, 2 ASTRONAUTICS & AERONAUTICS, Sept., 1964,
at 70, 74.
141 Tests were conducted at St. Louis, from July, 1961 through May, 1962; at
Oklahoma City from February through July, 1964; at Chicago from February through
March, 1965, and at Edwards Air Force Base in late 1967. Ortner, Sonic Boom: Con-
tainment or Confrontation, 34 J. AIR L. & Com. 208-09 (1968).
142 See Kryter, Sonic Booms from Supersonic Transports, 163 Sci. 359, 363-64
(1969).
143 Thompson & Parnell, Sonic Boom and the SST, 39 AIRCRAFT ENGINEERING,
Mar., 1967, at 14, 15; D. DWIGGINS, THE SST: HERE IT COMES READY OR NOT 131
(1968).
144 Alford & Driver, Recent Supersonic Transport Research, 2 ASTRONAUTICS &
AERONAUTICS, Sept. 1964, at 26, 36; Hutchinson, Defining the Sonic-Boom Problem,
1 ASTRONAUTICS & AEROSPACE ENGINEERING, Dec. 1963, at 56.
145 See Power, Some Results of the Oklahoma City Sonic Boom Tests, 4 MA-
TRhiALS RESEARCH & STANDARDS, 617, 620-23 (1964).
146 See Garrick, Atmospheric Effects on the Sonic Boom, in SECOND CONFERENCE
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percent of the time this magnification will double the intensity of
the original boom, thus producing overpressures of 3.0-4.0 psf and
perhaps higher. 4 ' Although booms of ordinary strength probably
will not cause ground damage, it is feared that the superbooms will.
The subject is not without controversy. It seems to be generally
agreed that no personal injury will be done to anyone by a super-
boom.' 48 Although the startle effect might give someone a heart
attack, so might the sudden acceleration of a motorcycle, an auto-
mobile backfire, or an "ordinary" sonic boom. The impact of the
shock wave itself is not strong enough to do physical harm.
There is more uncertainty about the nature and extent of pos-
sible property damage from the superboom. Materials engineers
stoutly maintain that various structural materials can withstand
enormous shock wave pressures,' 9 but courts have entertained suits
and juries have returned verdicts on testimony of indeterminate
pressures.'50 Even if allowance is made for the fact that judges and
juries do not always capture all the intricacies of technical testi-
mony, and that many of the claims are for structures weakened by
age, the elements and stress, there remains a large grey zone clouding
our understanding of property damage from shock wave.
The most thoroughly authenticated case of boom damage oc-
curred before the SST had even reached the design stage.
In midafternoon of Aug. 5, 1959, the control tower at Ottawa air-
port gave clearance to the pilot of an F-104 jet fighter to make two
low-level passes over the north-south runway. The first pass was un-
eventful. On the second pass the pilot made a slight left turn and
pull-out before passing the end of the runway .... This runway is
1200 feet away from one of the faces of the terminal building, but the
left heading brought the F-104 over the temporary control tower along
a curved path over the terminal building. As the pilot applied additional
ON SONIC BOOm RESEARCH 3 (NASA SP-180, 1968); Kane, Some Effects of the At-
mosphere on Sonic Boom, in SONIc Boom RESEARCH 49 (NASA SP-147, 1967).
147 Baxter, The SST: From Watts to Harlem in Two Hours, 21 STAN. L. REV.
1, 24-25 n.32 (1968).
148 A group of highly respected scientists has stated that "no damage to hearing
is expected even for booms of 100 psf" and "no direct physiological damage is expected
even for booms of 100 psf." National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council,
Report on Human Response to the Sonic Boom, Transmittal Letter (June, 1968);
see also Kryter, Sonic Booms from Supersonic Transports, 163 Sci. 359, 360 (1969).
149 See Mayes & Edge, Jr., Effects of Sonic Boom and Other Shock Waves on
Buildings, 4 MATERIALS RESEARCH & STANDARDS 588 (1964); McKinley, Response of
Glass in Windows to Sonic Booms, 4 MATERIALS RESEARCH & STANDARDS 594 (1964);
Newberry, Measuring the Sonic Boom and Its Effect on Buildings, 4 MATERIALS RE-
SEARCH & STANDARDS 601 (1964); Power, Some Results of the Oklahoma City Sonic
Boom Tests, 4 MATERIALS RESEARCH & STANDARDS 617 (1964).
150 See Firemen's Ins. Co. v. Alexander, 328 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959);
Alexander v. Firemen's Ins. Co., 317 S.W.2d 752 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958).
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power for his climb, the speed of the aircraft exceeded sonic speed.
Reports vary as to the altitude of the aircraft, and opinions differ as
to the sensitivity of the altimeter at its low altitude. It would appear
that the altitude was about 500 feet above ground before pull-out. 151
The case is ideal for study purposes. There were numerous eye-
witnesses. There is no doubt that the aircraft exceeded the speed
of sound. The flight was low, directly over the affected building
and the pilot engaged in the type of maneuvers now known to cause
boom magnification. There was no other intervening proximate cause
of damage to the building which was so new it was only ninety-eight
percent completed. 5
The building was a modern concrete and steel structure with
many windows and glass panels.' 53 Naturally a great deal of the
glass was broken. Moreover the roof was ripped, the ceilings dam-
aged, doorways dislodged, window frames wrenched, stucco cracked
and torn loose, and various fixtures and appliances damaged. It
does not appear, however, that the structural members of the build-
ing were weakened or the foundation undermined.' 54 The cost of
repairing the damage was $300,000.'11 There were no reported per-
sonal injuries.
The Ottawa experience clearly establishes that shock waves
from aircraft moving at supersonic speeds can cause very serious
property damage. The importance of this fact should not be played
down. At the same time it should also be noted that the damage here
was the result of a stunt and of pilot error. No one has any business
flying at, or near, the speed of sound 500 feet above ground and in
the immediate vicinity of buildings and people. In fact such flying
at much slower speeds would usually be regarded as hazardous. No
commercial airline would ever indulge in such conduct, and this
sort of flying cannot be related in any meaningful way to the opera-
tion of a supersonic transport. The Ottawa incident is a useful
warning of the potential severity of shock wave damage. It puts
everyone on alert that supersonic speed is not to be trifled with,
but such an incident is no more likely to occur after the SST is in
general use than it was before. It is unrealistic to point to this un-
fortunate event as illustrative of the kind of damage that the com-
mercial SST may cause. 158
151 Ramsay, Damage to Ottawa Air Terminal Building Produced by a Sonic
Boom, 4 MATERIALS RESEARCH & STANDARDS 612 (1964).
152 Id.
153 Id. at 613.
154 Id. at 615.
155 Id. at 616.
15 But see Baxter, The SST: From Watts to Harlem in Two Hours, 21 STAN.
L. REv. 1, 30 n.40 (1968). The overpressure at Ottawa may have exceeded 38 psf.
D. Dwicoms, THE SST: HERE IT COMES READY OR NoT 65 (1968).
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The SST is intended to cruise one hundred twenty to one hun-
dred forty times higher than the airplane involved in Ottawa. Since
airlines do not court lawsuits, one may rest assured that the SSTs
will be flown very carefully, with a minimum'of maneuvering and
sudden acceleration. There is a certain measure of comfort also in
the fact that in the thousands of supersonic flights since 1959, in-
cluding the 1253 Oklahoma City flights, no case of similarly severe
property damage has been documented, and surely many super-
booms have occurred in the millions upon millions of boom ex-
posures since that time.
In addition to the property damage which might result from
the sonic boom, opponents of the SST program are also concerned
with the "annoyance" factor. How do people react to the boom?
Overpressures below 1 psf seem to be generally tolerable, at 1.5 psf
most people become annoyed and above 2.0 psf everyone is an-
noyed.'57 At the outset of this article it was pointed out that noise
tolerance is a highly subjective matter. It was shown also that
in the several tests conducted over urban areas about twenty-
five percent of the population regarded the boom as intolerable.'58
The unemotional evidence of the photographic film, however, showed
many of the complaining population going placidly about their daily
business at the height of boom tests. Some accounts of the Oklahoma
City tests indicate that response to the boom may be affected by
greed, civic pride and other non-objective factors. 15 9 The current
plague of motorcycles which have now invaded our quietest suburbs
indicates that we are willing to put up with terrible noise, if only
it amuses our young-and a small minority of our young at that.
This is not to argue that we should accept sonic booms and super-
booms without a whimper. But, it does indicate that we are an
extraordinarily tolerant people when it comes to environmental
noise levels.
However, the attitude that we must tolerate sonic boom annoy-
ance in the name of progress or a spirit of neighborly laissez-faire
is unduly pessimistic as well as unrealistic. This state of affairs will
simply not come to pass. It ignores practicalities. The first prac-
ticality is that no one has threatened to operate the SST over popu-
lated areas without carefully controlled preliminary trial flights. The
second is that airlines depend for their existence on the goodwill of
the majority of the public. They are not about to alienate a large
157 Hutchinson, Defining the Sonic-Boom Problem, 1 ASTRONAUTICS & AEROSPACE-
ENGINEERING, Dec. 1963, at 56, 57.
158 See note 139 supra and accompanying text.




segment of their potential customers by unnecessarily assaulting
their ears, offending their sensibilities and destroying their property.
The quasi-official position of the United States Government
appears to be that there are no plans to operate the first generation
SST on overland routes. 16 0 This seems to be tacitly assumed by a
broad spectrum of persons engaged in the aviation industry. De-
signers, engineers, builders and government personnel, all readily
concede that no special design compromises have been made in the
present SST to minimize the sonic boom.
[D]eveloping a long-range, financially sound program in the U.S.
requires the first supersonic commercial airplane to be designed for
high flight Mach numbers. The first plane must therefore incorporate
structures and propulsion more advanced than those in operation.
The adoption of a much more ambitious program will probably
pay off in the future; but it will also contribute to delaying further
the availability of a first family of operational airplanes. It is ex-
tremely important, therefore, that the development program be carried
on at an accelerated pace, without delays or indecision related to
organizational problems, and without exaggerated emphasis on analyses
of relative merits and economic effectiveness of present and future
airplanes based on possible performance of first-generation SSTs.
The past has shown that new systems once in operation rapidly improve
much above initial expectations. 161
Speed then is the keynote for the first United States SST-
speed and getting it off the groundl Style, economy and other
"merits" are secondary and can safely be left to the second and
succeeding generations. Even so, some authorities insist that, al-
though the first-generation SST will be largely limited to overwater
flights, it can still be an economic success.' 62 The possibilities of
operating at subsonic speeds over densely populated areas, the use
of supersonic corridors over sparsely populated areas and the inter-
connection of subsonic overland transports with supersonic over-
water transports have not been fully explored.
The foregoing discussion of the damage situation and the
"annoyance" factor may still justify some moderate pessimism.
However, there is now much hopeful scientific evidence tending to
160 "Our program is based on the assumption that you do not fly overland. On
that assumption we make the clear cut and affirmative statement that you have got
an economically viable airplane even if you are confined to overwater routes." State-
ment of General William F. McKee, Administrator, FAA. Hearings Before the House
Subcomm. of the Comm. on Appropriations, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 318 (1967).
"We have based our SST program decisions on the conservative assumption that
this design is to be operated primarily over water." Statement of Major General
Jewell C. Maxwell, Director, Supersonic Transport Development. Id. at 294.
161 Ferri, SST-A Sound National Decision, 2 ASTRONAUTICS & AERONAUTICS, Sept.,
1964, at 15.
162 See General McKee's statement, supra note 160; Borger & Hibbs, What's
an Economic SST? 2 ASTRONAUTICS & AERONAUTICS, Sept., 1964, at 16.
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prove that a great deal of the boom may soon be taken out of
supersonic flight. Very recent studies have indicated that the ratio
of the measured overpressure to the calculated overpressure is less
than previously thought. 63 In other words, the measured boom and
the predicted boom have been brought into closer agreement. A
greater number of samples, more accurate measurement and im-
proved prediction techniques have combined to produce more re-
liable results. Significant diminution in superboom overpressures now
appear to be within reasonable expectations.' 64 Configuration studies
show that considerable boom reduction may also be achieved by
design changes. 65 It may well be, for instance, that overland routes
could be served by a smaller, slimmer SST specifically designed for
less boom, perhaps at the sacrifice of speed or some other factor.
A prominent aeronautical engineer, Edwin L. Resler, has an-
nounced the development of a new supersonic jet design which
will help to reduce the sonic boom produced by the SST. 66 As has
been shown earlier, careful flying will also help prevent the occur-
rence of sonic booms.
In this state of the art, it seems premature to anticipate dis-
aster. True, the supersonic transport has a great potential for harm,
but it also has a great potential for valuable service in the public
interest. The present outlook for a cure of its more objectionable
features is reasonably optimistic. Common-sense, the concern of
our political leaders and the enlightened self-interest of the airlinesjoin forces here to assure us that supersonic booms will not be
thrust upon us willy-nilly. The United States SST seems to be fol-
lowing a rational developmental path and no strong reasons sug-
gest that it be prevented from doing so. The vigilance necessary to
prevent abuse is being exercised.
Domestic Law
Will the existent judicial precedents, statutes and ordinances
apply to the phenomenon of the sonic boom? It seems safe to assume
that whenever the noise produced by supersonic aircraft is similar
163 Garrick, Atmospheric Effects on the Sonic Boom, in SECOND 'CONFERENCE ON
SONIC Boom RESEARCH 3, 12 (NASA SP-180, 1968).
164 Id.
165 See Alford & Driver, Recent Supersonic Transport Research, ASTRONAUTICS
& AERONAUTICS, Sept., 1964 at 26-28; McLean & Shrout, Design Methods for Mini-
mization of Sonic-Boom-Pressure-Field Disturbances, 39 J. ACOUSTICAL Soc'y Am.§ 19 (1966); Ferri & Ismail, Report on Sonic Boom Studies, in SECOND CONFERENCE
ON SONIC Boom RESEARCH 73 (NASA SP-180, 1968); Howes, On Supersonic Vehicle
Shapes for Reducing Auditory Response to Sonic Booms, in SONIC Boom RESEARCH
103 (NASA SP-147, 1967).
166 San Francisco Chronicle, June 28, 1968, at 44, col. 3.
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to the noise produced by ordinary jets, the courts will reach for the
old familiar precedents. Where, however, the noise is exclusively
a product of supersonic flight (the sonic boom itself), precedents
established for subsonic flight, although available, will not be as
comforting, or as dispositive of the issue. In this situation, as well
as in the determination of the applicability of the new ordinances
and statutes specifically directed at sonic boom, there remains a
very large area of legal uncertainty. Here, individual rights have
not been formulated and the public interest has not been determined.
Despite the extensive sonic boom tests recounted in these pages
and the many years of military flying at supersonic speeds to which
United States residents have been exposed, the sonic boom has made
comparatively few appearances in our case reports. These few cases
are far from conclusive as the following discussion will demonstrate.
An early case was Alexander v. Firemen's Insurance Com-
pany,'16 7 which appeared in the Texas courts in 1958 and 1959. The
plaintiff brought action against his insurers for damage to his ware-
house allegedly caused by the flight of jet aircraft in the area where
the building was located. The district court withdrew all issues
from the jury and rendered judgment for the insurance company.168
The plaintiff appealed.
The court of civil appeals held that the phrase "direct loss by
• . . aircraft" in the insurance policy, fairly understood, included
damage from sonic boom.'69 Since the damage was a covered risk,
the plaintiff was entitled to take to the jury the question whether
his loss had been proximately caused by a sonic boom. The court
reversed and remanded the cause for new trial. 7° The opinion de-
lared that the issue of coverage under the policy's "explosion"
clause was not before the court, since no evidence had been adduced
on that issue at trial. It affirmed that the trial court was cor-
rect in refusing to take judicial notice that a sonic boom was an
explosion .171
On remand, the district court, after a jury trial, rendered judg-
ment for the plaintiff in the sum of $2,750 and the insurer appealed.
The court of civil appeals affirmed 172 in an opinion written by the
same judge who had written the opinion in the first appeal. The
167 317 S.W.2d 752 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958).
168 Id. at 753.
169 Id. at 755.
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 Firemen's Ins. Co. v. Alexander, 328 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
[Vol. 9
THE SST
appellate tribunal found the evidence sufficient to sustain the judg-
ment of the trial court.173
The two opinions are strangely unsatisfactory. The facts indi-
cate that the building was of frame and metal, well-built, without
visible signs of deterioration and only two years old at the time
of the "blast," which occurred in 1956.11 It is said that the build-
ing collapsed and was extensively damaged after "a terrific blast
or sonic boom occurred over Hico.' 171 One opinion states that the
plaintiff alleged that the force and pressure of the "air disturbance,
created by the aircraft, unseated the girders beneath the building
and capsized it.' 176 Yet, neither opinion mentions that any witness
saw an airplane, much less estimated its altitude or speed. There is
no description nor identification of any airplane in the opinions,
and, absent access to the trial records, the matter is left to the
reader's imagination. These appellate opinions thus lose much of
their value as contributions to the development of sonic boom law.
On August 31, 1956, during an air show at Will Rogers Field
in Oklahoma City, an Air Force pilot flew at supersonic speeds. The
original plaintiff sued the United States Government and its in-
surer, Lloyds' of London, for $750 damage to his property from
sonic boom. Three hundred others alleging damages of $25 to $4000
from the same source were allowed to intervene. 177
It developed at trial that Lloyds' had insured the United States
against the hazards of the air show "and that the policy covered
claims arising out of sound wave shock resulting from aircraft pass-
ing through the sonic barrier."17 The United States admitted a
single low-level flight on August 31, 1956, causing glass breakage
in the air terminal building at Will Rogers Field.17 There was judg-
ment for the defendant insurers and the plaintiffs perfected an
appeal.
The federal circuit court reversed and remanded for dismissal
because of an improper joinder of parties.'10 The impropriety lay in
the fact that the cause of action against Lloyds' was on the contract
of insurance, and the suit against the United States sounded in
tort.'8 ' For purposes of this analysis, the case has little precedential
value.
173 Id. at 352.
174 Alexander v. Firemen's Ins. Co., 317 S.W.2d at 754.
175 Id.
178 Firemen's Ins. Co. v. Alexander, 328 S.W.2d at 351.
177 Lloyds' London v. Blair, 262 F.2d 211 (10th Cir. 1958).
178 Id. at 212.
179 Id.




In Coxsey v. Hallaby, s2 a federal district court refused to en-
join the 1964 Oklahoma City sonic boom tests. The court held that
it had no jurisdiction in the matter since the test program was author-
ized by federal statute"8 and the United States had not consented to
the suit. Moreover, the court stated that even if the matter had been
within its jurisdiction, it would still enter judgment for the defendant
since the plaintiffs had failed to establish irreparable injury, had an
adequate remedy at law and thus had shown no right to equitable
relief.' 4
Since the action was brought while the tests were in progress,
the opinion of the trial judge may be considered as a species of res
gestae and thus has particular significance. He accepts without ques-
tion, and without citation of 'authority, the results of prior govern-
ment tests which "demonstrated that sonic booms of one hundred
twenty psf did not have any adverse effect upon the health of persons
on the ground and that no pain was experienced by human beings at
less than forty pounds per square foot."'88 He then goes on to say
that the test overpressures did not exceed 2.0 psf and that these sonic
booms had no noticeable effect on the buildings equipped with in-
strumentation by the FAA.'
The judge had serious reservations about the credibility and
reliability of the testimony offered by the claimants and their sup-
porters.
The emotions of all witnesses who testified on behalf of the plain-
tiffs were noticeably involved. Their extreme irritation indicated
strongly that they were the type individuals who are easily ir-
ritated .... [T]hey and others objecting to the continuation of the
boom project were actuated, and their irritation increased by their
belief that the government did not intend to make just compensation
for any possible damage caused by the vibration created by the sonic
booms. Emotionally stable and disinterested citizens were not upset nor
unduly annoyed by the booms. Most did not notice them at all, as
clearly shown by motion pictures placed in evidence. I think it proper
to state that throughout the various hearings the conclusion was in-
escapable that the protests to the "booms" were being aggressively
voiced by a very few persons, and that their protests were not repre-
sentative of the attitude of the rank and file citizen.'
8 7
It would be difficult to conceive of a more unsympathetic re-
action to those who seek relief from sonic booms. If this feeling
182 231 F. Supp. 978 (W.D. Okla. 1964).
188 Id. at 979; 49 U.S.C. § 1353(b) (1964).
184 231 F. Supp. at 980.
185 Id. at 979.
186 Id.
187 Id. at 980 (emphasis added).
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should spread generally through the judiciary, it bodes ill for future
claimants of injury from sonic booms.
Coxsey is perhaps not as atypical as its strong language might
lead one to believe. The courts have in fact been quite unsympa-
thetic. In a 1964 case in which the plaintiff had alleged personal
injury and property damage (broken glass) ,18 the government's
motion for summary judgment was granted on the ground that the
supersonic program involving military aircraft fell within the dis-
cretionary function exemption of the Federal Tort Claims Act. 189 A
1965 federal case then held that where there was no evidence of
cracked or shattered glass in his building, the plaintiff's evidence
was insufficient to establish a sonic boom, since glass breakage is
the first damage to occur in instances of exposure to sonic booms. 1 0
Bennett v. United States 9' decided that "physical invasion of
... shock waves . .. do not constitute a taking of property as op-
posed to a mere nuisance and trespass."'12 The plaintiff was, there-
fore, denied recovery under the Tucker Act.'98 This is believed to be
the pnly case in which a court has specifically held that there can be
no taking by sonic boom.
In Dabney v. United States194 and Lorick v. United States,'
the courts held that the plaintiffs had not sustained their burdens of
proof. In Dabney, the court found that the overpressure on the plain-
tiff's residence caused by the B-58s (1.26 psf), was not great enough
to do any damage. 96 According to this court, a B-58 must cause a
10 psf overpressure in order to injure property. The court also stated
that a B-58 must fly supersonically at 6,000 feet altitude in order to
exert an overpressure of 10 psf on the ground.'97 In Lorick, the
court held that the plaintiff had failed to show that defendant's
aircraft exceeded the speed of sound. 9 " Thus, plaintiff had failed
to prove that the defendant had caused any sonic booms. 9
For one reason or another, the plaintiffs in all of the foregoing
sonic boom cases were denied recovery. However, prospective plain-
188 Huslander v. United States, 234 F. Supp. 1004 (W.D.N.Y. 1964).
189 Id. at 1005; 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1964).
190 Tabb v. United States, 267 F. Supp. 187 (M.D. Ga. 1965); see also 32 J. Am.
TRIAL LAWYERs Ass'N 724-30 (1968).
191 266 F. Supp. 627 (W.D. Okla. 1965).
192 Id. at 630.
193 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1964).
194 249 F. Supp. 599 (W.D.N.C. 1965).
195 267 F. Supp. 96 (D.S.C. 1967).
196 249 F. Supp. at 600.
197 Id. at 599.
198 267 F. Supp. at 100.
199 Id. at 102.
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tiffs in suits to recover for sonic boom damage may find a small mea-
sure of encouragement in Neher v. United States. 0 There, plaintiff
was the owner of a sixty-five year old apartment building in St. Paul,
Minnesota, situated eight to ten miles from the center line of an air
corridor designated by the Air Force as the Minneapolis corridor.
This corridor was about twenty nautical miles wide and from three
to six hundred nautical miles long. 10 From April 5, 1962 through
August 6, 1962, B-58 Air Force planes made forty-one supersonic
flights over the Minneapolis-St. Paul area. These flights were at
Mach 2.0 and 30,000 to 50,000 feet altitude.2 °2 Plaintiff specifically
noted the occurrence of sonic booms over her property during that
period. She and some of her tenants also noticed plaster cracks and
broken windows at that time. Subsequently, squeaks developed in the
floors and stairway.0 3
The plaintiff's action for property damage was brought under
both the Federal Tort Claims Act 20 4 and the Tucker Act.2 °5 A judg-
ment was rendered for the plaintiff for $750 under the Federal Tort
Claims Act, but no recovery was allowed under the Tucker Act since
there can be no constitutional taking without physical invasion by
low and frequent overflights? °0
The court found that the discretionary function exemption of
the tort claims act had been waived by stipulation of counsel. °"
This opened the way for a finding that designation of the populous
Minneapolis-St. Paul area as an air corridor amounted to negligence
where many less heavily populated areas were available for the pur-
pose.208 The court felt that the defendant should have recognized
that sonic booms of low strength constitute a risk to substandard
structures even though such booms usually do not cause damage. 0 9
The court had little trouble with causation despite the testimony of
expert witnesses that the booms were not the cause of the damage.
The court distinguished between legal cause and scientific cause and
pointed out that liability attaches to legal cause which existed here.210
Those who sue commercial SSTs for sonic boom damage will
200 265 F. Supp. 210 (D. Minn. 1967).
201 Id. at 213.
202 Id. at 212.
203 Id. at 213.
204 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1964).
205 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (1964).
206 Neher v. United States, 265 F. Supp. 210, 216 (D. Minn. 1967) ; see also
32 J. AM. TRIAL LAWYERS ASS'N 727-28 (1968), re application of the Tucker Act.
207 265 F. Supp. at 214-15.
208 Id. at 217.
209 Id. at 218.
210 Id. at 217-18.
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not be hindered by a discretionary function exemption, but even
then the outlook for recovery seems rather bleak. The Alexander
cases 2 ' discussed previously indicate the possibility of recovery
under "aircraft damage" and "explosion" clauses of property insur-
ance policies, but astute insurers will surely block this loophole if it
still exists. Perhaps the insurance companies will develop new
"sonic boom" coverage at appropriate rates. The Neher case 12 in-
dicates that some courts may be willing to find liability for sonic
boom damage, although this is tenuous comfort since the issue there
was exclusively one of governmental liability.
International Law
The scope of this paper does not permit an in-depth inquiry
into the application of international law to the operation of com-
mercial SSTs. It is apparent, however, that since the sonic boom
may carpet an area fifty miles wide,213 off-shore supersonic flights
by United States commercial SSTs may affect the nationals of for-
eign nations and their property. Similarly, foreign commercial SSTs
may also cause damage while flying at supersonic speeds off the
coast of the United States. In both instances, overflights will also
present a risk of sonic boom damage to the territory below.
The sonic boom problem presented by commercial supersonic
flight is novel and was not taken into consideration when the inter-
national air agreements now in force were negotiated, or when the
various national air laws were enacted. However, there are general
powers in many of these agreements and laws which might be in-
voked to restrict supersonic flight. For instance, the Chicago Con-
vention of 1944, ratified by 75 nations 214 including the United States,
provides that a country may "restrict or prohibit" aircraft from
flying over portions of its territory "for reasons of public safety. ' 215
The only limitations on this power are that each prohibition must
be applied uniformly and that the prohibited areas must be "of
reasonable extent and location so as not to interfere unnecessarily
with air navigation. 216
211 Firemen's Ins. Co. v. Alexander, 328 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959);
Alexander v. Firemen's Ins. Co., 317 S.W.2d 752 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958).
212 Neher v. United States, 265 F. Supp. 210 (D. Minn. 1967).
213 See Baxter, The SST: From Watts to Harlem in Two Hours, 21 STAN. L.
REv. 1, 37 (1968); Kryter, Sonic Booms from Supersonic Transport, 163 Sci. 359,
365 (1969).
214 HOUSE COmm. ON SCIENCE AD ASTRONAUTICS, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., AIR
LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD 1402-03 (Comm. Print 1961).





It is certainly conceivable that signatories to this agreement
might regard supersonic flight over their territories, or within fifty
miles of their borders, as a danger to their "public safety" within
the meaning of the Chicago Convention. That issue, as well as the
question of the reasonableness of any prohibitions and the unifor-
mity of their application would create serious problems for those
who wish to fly supersonic aircraft on international routes.
A number of existing foreign air laws prohibit "dangerous fly-
ing" and provide for the levy of fines, and imprisonment, against the
pilot and the owner of the offending aircraft, whenever it is "flown
in such a manner as to be the cause of unnecessary danger to any
person or property on land or water.12 17 It does not require strained
interpretation to include supersonic flight within the general under-
standing of the quoted prohibition.
Many air laws also provide that an aircraft owner is absolutely
liable for "material loss or damage . . . caused to any person or
property on land or water by . . . an aircraft while in flight. 218 It
would be difficult to contend that aircraft in supersonic flight should
be exempted from the application of these provisions.
Most of the presently effective air laws regulate the altitude of
flights over the territory for the safety of persons or property on
land or water.219 In theory, at least, individual countries could set
minimum altitudes for supersonic flights so high as to make such
flights impractical or impossible.
In addition to all of the foregoing, a majority of the current air
laws grant the appropriate administrative agencies a general power
to make all rules necessary to prevent aircraft from "endangering
other persons and property" and, in general, to insure safe flight of
aircraft over their countries.22°
Enough has been said to indicate that the approaching age of
supersonic air travel should be preceded by an international conven-
tion to settle the rules by which such travel will be controlled.
217 Civil Aviation Act of Great Britain, 12 & 13 Geo. 6, c. 67, art. 10 (1949);
see also Dept. of Industries and Labor, Indian Aircraft Rules, art. 21 (1937) ; Civil
Aviation Act of New Zealand, N.Z. STAT. 1948, art. 6.
218 Civil Aviation Act of Great Britain, supra note 216, at art. 40; see also
Brazilian Code of the Air, Decree-Law No. 483, art. 97 (1938) ; Air Code of the
U.S.S.R., No. 14/1713, art. 78 (1935).
219 E.g., Civil Aeronautics Law of Japan, Law No. 231, art. 81 (1952) ; see also
Aviation Law of Austria, art. 124 (1957).




This inquiry shows that supersonic airplanes may bring about
a change in the quantity of airport noise, but they are not likely to
affect the quality of that noise. It seems unlikely that the SSTs will
trigger radical reforms in the legal rules applicable to airport noise,
because they simply will not make a radical physical change in such
noise. The airport noise problem cries out for a cure without the
SST, and the advent of that type of aircraft will not improve the
situation, but it will not make it much worse either. Reform of
"tairport" law will not find its raison d'etre in the SST and reformers
must seek their impetus elsewhere.
Somewhat more surprisingly perhaps, it seems that the sonic
boom will be inexorably assimilated into existing law. Already,
courts have refused to find that there can be a constitutional taking
of property by the supersonic shock wave sweeping across the
ground. Trespass and nuisance then seem fated to be the vehicles
for property damage litigation involving a sonic boom. One would
have thought that this phenomenon was sufficiently different from
anything which preceded it to spur judicial minds to imaginative
and inventive solutions. This has certainly not been the case and
there is considerable doubt whether trespass will be considered an
appropriate vehicle, particularly in cases where there is no over-
flight but only lateral flight. This leaves the boom-suffering citizen
with only one arrow in his legal quiver-nuisance. The paucity of
legal remedies calls for intensive, careful analysis. A new injury
demands a new remedy.
When confronted with the possibility of some injury to the pub-
lic and the presently inadequate machinery for compensating such
injury, the temptation to prevent the cause of harm from coming
into existence is very strong. Stop the problem by stopping the SST
is an easy and attractive rallying cry. It is also demonstrably un-
satisfactory.
Three foreign countries are already engaged in manufacturing
SSTs and presumably they are committed to using them. Are we pre-
pared to bar British, French and Russian SSTs from flying to our
airports or within 50 miles from our shores? Can we enforce such a
bar within recognized principles of international law? Assuming we
could, do we want to offend international comity by doing so?
National airlines in Canada and Mexico may decide to operate
SSTs and be permitted to do so by national law. Are we prepared
to tell these countries they cannot fly supersonically over their own
territories because they will thus cause booms in several northern
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states or in Texas? The adoption of this position by the United
States is certain to cause ill-feeling with two friendly and peaceful
neighbors.
Consideration should also be given to the effect the SST may
have on our aircraft industry. A newsmagazine has recently stated
that the future of the aeronautical industries of France and Great
Britain rests in large measure on the success of the Concorde. The
airplane is described as a gamble for enormous stakes.22 ' If the SST
is of such marked importance to the aircraft industries of Great
Britain and France, it surely also must be of some significance to
the United States aircraft industry.
Outlawing the SST is not a sensible answer to the problems it
presents. It would not guarantee complete protection from sonic
booms; it might cause unfortunate stresses with friendly (and un-
friendly) nations; and it would surely place our own aircraft manu-
facturers at a competitive disadvantage in world markets. It would
exclude United States citizens and industries from most of the bene-
fits of the SST without protecting them entirely from its harmful
effects.
The SST is here. We must accept it and cope with it. We can
best cope with it by continuing to do all the things we have already
done to protect ourselves from aircraft noises and by doing these
things more efficiently and effectively.
Zoning laws and practices must be gradually changed to provide
for restriction of airport neighborhoods to industries not affected
by loud noise. Where residential zoning in these areas is inescapable,
an increased use must be made of air conditioning and sound-
proofing in order to make these residences comfortably habitable.
This area will not provide a quick solution, but the effort must
nonetheless be made.
Research in SST designs must be continued; flight techniques
must be improved and flight maneuvers must be rigidly controlled;
adaptation of the airplane to its mission (land or sea) must become
a fixed policy. All of these steps will decrease the number of booms
and minimize those that do occur. This list is illustrative rather than
exclusive and other alleviatory measures will certainly be developed.
A people intelligent enough to develop a supersonic airplane
must surely be ingenious enough to render it acceptable. Research
to this end must be intensified.
221 Flight of the Fast Bird, TimE, Mar. 14, 1969, at 87.
